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27 October 1947

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF, FBIS LONDON BUREAU

SUBJECT: Marshall File at London Conference

Document No. 232

No Change In Class. ☐☐ Declassified

Class. Changed to: TS S

Next Review Date: 1989

Auth: HR 70-3

Date: 03/07/79

By: []

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1. The daily survey of USSR, USSR-controlled, and miscellaneous radio comments on the London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers is to be prepared (as was the similar file on the Moscow Conference) primarily for anticipated or hoped-for reading by Secretary Marshall. Consequently, it should be designed in terms of Secretary Marshall's preferences with regard to written reports submitted to him. Namely:

The Secretary is generally averse to reading any report that is longer than two pages (legal size permissible) of double-spaced, typewritten (elite) material. In this respect, some of the reports prepared during the Moscow Conference erred in length per se, although their length was partially justified in that they included reactions to the Truman Doctrine as well as the Moscow Conference issues themselves. (It is assumed that since the Conference is to be in London, the daily survey can be prepared in typewritten form and delivered by special messenger to the American delegation rather than transmitted via teletype as was the case during the Moscow Conference. The report, however, should also be filed daily, via signals, to Washington.)

For reports that are submitted on a regular daily basis, the Secretary prefers a standardized format with subject-matter heads of a recurrent character appearing regularly in the submitted reports.

2. Since the main issues at the London Conference will be essentially the same as those that faced the Foreign Ministers at Moscow, it is recommended that the format (in terms of rubrics considered) also remain essentially the same as those considered in the Marshall File during the Moscow Conference:

Introduction (A paragraph presenting a general overview of Soviet propaganda about the Conference issues--with particular attention to the relationship of these issues, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the total pattern of Soviet radio propaganda.)

A. Germany

1. Potsdam Agreement
2. German unity and alleged U.S.-British plans to split Germany
3. Establishment of German Government

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4. Reparations
5. Economic unity and economic principles
6. Alleged U.S. economic infiltration
7. Demasification and war criminals
8. U.S. draft demilitarization treaty and reduction of occupying forces
9. Displaced persons

B. Austrian Treaty

C. Miscellaneous

Although these rubrics should probably be treated daily, consideration for regularity of format as applied to Conference issues should not be so rigid that others cannot or should not be added in case they warrant inclusion. During the Moscow Conference, for example, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and Soviet reaction thereto was considered so important with reference to the whole international scene and to the Conference itself that it was added as a regular subject for consideration in the Marshall File.

As to the general "frame of reference" for the daily survey, emphasis should be given to the general Soviet propaganda line relative to the Conference itself and to its specific issues, significant shifts or variations therein, propaganda strategy and tactics--particularly as implicitly or explicitly related to actual Soviet policy, current or anticipated, at London. Particular attention should also be given to any indications in Soviet propaganda that may have a bearing on Soviet attitude as to the Conference's success or failure and to propaganda developments that appear to anticipate either of these eventualities.

3. Of the issues outlined under paragraph 2 above, probably the most crucial (as far as the possibility of any kind of Soviet accommodation is concerned) is that of reparations. At least this appeared to be the case during the Moscow Conference. Consequently, the attitude of the Soviet radio to this issue should of course be followed closely.

4. Another issue of major importance is that of German "unity"--which has, in Soviet eyes, probably grown in importance since the announcement of the Marshall Plan and the resulting increased volume and intensity of Soviet charges that American "warmongers, imperialists, etc." are planning to use Germany as the bastion of a Western Bloc posed against the East, to which the "New Comintern" is also related. Involved in the whole problem of German unity is the question of what may happen to the Soviet zone--whether, for example, the Soviets and their supporters in the Soviet zone may be planning a form of "independence" for the zone in case Russian demands are not met, which might, in effect, represent a more or less permanent incorporation of the zone into the Soviet sphere of things.

5. Although the Secretary and our delegation in London will obviously be primarily interested in Soviet propaganda as it is related specifically to Conference issues and as it may explain, "justify", or adumbrate Soviet policy at the Conference, attention to Soviet propaganda about the Conference as it may be or is related to other major problems or issues of world politics (e.g., to the United Nations, the "Truman-Marshall

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policy," the "New Comintern," the situation in France and Italy, etc.)-- or to the latter as related to the Conference--should not be neglected entirely.

6. Primary attention should obviously be given broadcasts from Moscow. At the same time, however, the USSR-controlled German radio is important as a source of Soviet-inspired comment which can be more readily used than the Soviet radio itself for floating balloons and which also may on occasion reflect Soviet policy in Germany more accurately, operationally, or in greater detail than Soviet broadcasts themselves--and also may be more indicative of the attitude of the Germans themselves. The broadcasts from French radios are also of great importance.

7. It is not necessary to identify the broadcasts reported on in the daily survey by time, date, etc. Identification of transmitter, however, and, on occasion, of commentator(s), should be included with reference to specific broadcasts that may be singled out for special consideration. Commentaries and reports that are broadcast in several languages should be so indicated in terms of number of languages and number of broadcasts.

8. Beginning 10 November, or as soon thereafter as practicable, I would appreciate your preparing a few days' sample reports for transmission to Washington for our constructive criticism.

9. The Special Reports Division here in Washington plans to furnish the Secretary a weekly summary (similar to that prepared just prior to the Moscow Conference) for three weeks prior to the London Conference. You will be furnished copies of these reports for your information and guidance.

10. When the American Delegation arrives in London, you should contact Mr. Charles Bohlen, Counsellor for the Secretary of State, and arrange for daily delivery of your reports.

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